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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION HELD IN CIA 2 FEBRUARY 1952

SUBJECT: RDB Request

My conclusion after discussion with Chadwell, [ ] of O/SI on this problem is as follows: The RDB paper should be made available to the IAC. General Smith should discuss the subject as follows:

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1. The RDB request has been received. It is a reasonable request and important in terms of national security. CIA believes it should be answered favorably. I would like to indicate in the letter that the other intelligence agencies concerned are willing to participate in getting the best and most authoritative report possible for the RDB on an annual basis.

2. I would propose that in those sections requiring technical intelligence most immediately needed for operational purposes the military agencies should provide the contributions.

3. That in those sections which are dealing at the other end of the spectrum with matters mainly scientific in the research and development sense O/SI should accept the responsibility for producing contributions.

4. In those sections in which it becomes impossible to define neatly between scientific research and development and the technical for operational purposes that small working teams composed of the responsible agencies should be established to produce the contributions. These should be in to CIA by the first of August for collation and assembly in order that a paper can then be submitted for consideration and approval of a group composed of a representative of each of the Chiefs of Intelligence. This then would be submitted on 1 January to the RDB as national intelligence and this procedure should be followed on an annual basis.

5. (In the event that the question of the JTIS is raised): As far as the JTIS is concerned, how the military wishes to arrange for making its contribution to this paper is up to the military.

6. (If the question is asked where does the SIC and its subcommittees come in?): As far as the SIC and its subcommittees are concerned it would seem to me that we needn't worry too much about that. If the group now working on Atomic Energy as the JAEIC, is doing a good job and can get along, fine. If there are other

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subcommittees of the SIC where the people can't get along I would suggest we forget about it. And as far as the SIC itself is concerned since there has been quite a little argument about that and not much useful production or results I would say let's just wash it out.

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1. Lunch with [REDACTED]  
Major subject of discussion was intergovernmental estimates. See my paper on this subject.

2. Becker's meeting with the ADs re:

a. Budget discussions: Becker's approach is to determine how valid are the projects each office is now working on and to prepare a report on the effect of budget cuts on these projects.

b. Watch Committee: Lofly began by raising the question whether the Watch Committee wasn't a serious problem judging from the spate of rumors. Raised a question of whether CIA should establish its own Watch Committee. Reaction of Douglass and Kent was in sympathy with the negative criticisms of G-2 handling of the Watch Committee. Reference was made to the [REDACTED] Report and implied failure to implement that. Reber pointed out distinction between the result or the report which has been generally considered satisfactory by the IAC and General Smith in particular, and the procedure whereby it is achieved. It was suggested that the inadequacies of the Report might be detected by screening it against the Situation Summary (by O/CI) and that where important shortcomings were noted, they should be brought to the attention of the Watch Committee regardless of what field this occurs. Insofar as the procedure was imperfect, we ought to ask ourselves whether we have in fact sought, in meeting, to make helpful changes. My impression was that [REDACTED] and Becker considered these salient points while Douglass and Kent neither appeared impressed or persuaded. In other words let's help make the DCI's decision and the IAC agreement on it work before asking him and the IAC to change their decision by moving the Watch Committee back to CIA.

c. Intelligence Memoranda to the President: Lofly mentioned his contemplated scheme of having IAC members "note" intelligence memoranda before they went to the President - this being something short of concurrence, though that would be helpful if given. Kent shied away from more representatives meetings which he said would destroy the value of the memorandum in view of the time element though Douglass was concerned about the personal relations of the DCI and the President which he felt must be preserved. Becker said that he was sensitive to this but also recognized a responsibility to avoid flaps with the other agencies. Reber called attention to the fact that while it is important to preserve the Director's personal relations with the President, the DCI should also consider the effects, either in relations of the President with the Secretary of State and Defense or his relations with the latter two in conducting out his personal relations with the President. Certainly he

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cannot wish to cause unnecessary difficulties for either the President, Secretary of State, or Secretary of Defense. When one reflects on Pearl Harbor and the establishment of the Agency, it comes to mind that transmitting intelligence opinion or raw information to the President without providing the same to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State for reasons of urgency, is a bit contradictory. Insofar as it is urgent it would appear to be equally significant to the other agencies so that they could take appropriate action. To the extent it is not that significant, it ceases to be urgent and therefore such reasoning cannot be applied to defend sole distribution to the President. Insofar as the DCI's privately providing intelligence opinion or raw information has the effect of providing supervisory data on Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense, it is questionable.

25X1 d. [ ] Request for NIE's relating to the Far East. Lofty gave me a paper to prepare something on respecting this subject.

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